

**GTS ROOT CA**  
**DISCLOSURE OF PRINCIPLES STATEMENT**

---

Global Trusted Sign

Document Reference | DP05\_GTS\_V9

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. References .....	3
2. Associated Documents .....	3
3. Distribution List.....	3
4. Document History.....	3
5. Document Classification .....	3
6. Revision Record.....	3
7. Introduction.....	4
7.1. Purpose.....	4
7.2. Target Audience .....	5
7.3. Document Structure.....	5
8. Contacts of the GTS ROOT Certification Authority .....	5
9. Types of certificates, validation and use procedures .....	6
9.1. Certificate Usage .....	6
9.2. Validation Procedures.....	6
10. Limitation of trust in certificates .....	7
10.1. Certificate Usage .....	7
10.2. Audit Logs .....	8
11. Holders Responsibilities .....	8
12. Status Verification of Certificates issued by the GTS ROOT CA.....	9
13. Limitations and Responsibilities .....	10
14. Agreements, Certification Practices Statement and Certification Policies .....	10
15. Privacy Policy .....	10
16. Governing Law and Dispute Resolution .....	11
17. Compensations.....	11
18. Legislation and Standards.....	11
19. Audits and Security Standards .....	11
20. Acronyms .....	11

<p><b>1. References</b></p>	<p>European Regulation N° 910/2014          ETSI 319 411-1          ETSI 319 412          ETSI 319 401          RFC 5280: Internet X.509 PKI - Certificate and CRL Profile, 2008          CA/Browser Forum: Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates, v.1.4.7;          ETSI TS 102 042: Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates, v2.4.1</p>
<p><b>2. Associated Documents</b></p>	<p>DP01_GTS - GTS ROOT CA Certification Practice Statement          PL11_GTS – GTS ROOT CA Policy</p>
<p><b>3. Distribution List</b></p>	<p>Interested parties in the GTS trust hierarchy</p>
<p><b>4. Document History</b></p>	<p>31-07-2017   Version 1          16-04-2018   Version 2          02-05-2020   Version 3          24-06-2020   Version 4          17-09-2020   Version 5          04-10-2021   Version 6          22-07-2022   Version 7          15-02-2023   Version 8          04-07-2023   Version 9</p>
<p><b>5. Document Classification</b></p>	<p>D   Public</p>

**6. Revision Record**

Version Number	Creation	Approval	Reason
9	04-07-2023	04-07-2023	Annual verification of the document and update of values associated with telephone contacts
	<p><b>Security Administrator</b>            Débora Sofia Vieira Rodrigues</p>	<p><b>Management Group</b>            Tolentino de Deus Faria Pereira</p>	


## 7. Introduction

### 7.1. Purpose

This document is intended to summarize, in a simple and accessible way, the features described in the Certificate Policies and in the Certification Policy Statement of the Public Key Infrastructure of the Root Certification Authority of Global Trusted Sign (hereinafter referred to as the Root Certification Authority of GTS or GTS ROOT CA).

The infrastructure of the GTS ROOT CA provides a trust hierarchy that promotes the electronic security of the digital certificate holder. The GTS ROOT CA establishes an electronic trust structure that provides secure electronic transactions, strong authentication, a mean for electronically signing transactions or electronic documents, ensuring its accountability, integrity and non-repudiation, and guaranteeing the confidentiality of transactions or information.

The GTS ROOT CA is a certification authority accredited by the National Security Office (*Gabinete Nacional de Segurança*) (<http://www.gns.gov.pt/trusted-lists.aspx>), as defined in the Portuguese and European legislation, and is thus legally entitled to issue several types of qualified digital certificates. The GTS ROOT CA represents the root of the trust hierarchy, represented in the following figure:



#### Legend:

- 1 – GTS Root CA – GTS Root Certification Authority
- 2 – SUBCA01 - Certification Authority
- 3 – TSA001 - GTS Timestamping Certification Authority
- 4 – SUBCANQ02 - GTS Non-Qualified Certification Authority
- 5 – SUBCA03– GTS Certification Authority
- 6 – TSA002 – GTS Timestamping Certification Authority
- 7 – SUBNQ03 – GTS Non-Qualified Certification Authority

**7.2. Target Audience**

This document should be read by the holders and subscribers of certificates issued by the GTS ROOT CA.

**7.3. Document Structure**

This document is organized in accordance with the ETSI EN 319 411-1 standard.

This document is the GTS ROOT CA Disclosure of Principles Statement, and its associated OID is 1.3.6.1.4.1.50302.1.1.3.1.1.0, while the OIDs associated with the GTS ROOT CA Certificate Policy is 1.3.6.1.4.1.50302.1.1.2.1.1.0:

Document information	
Document Name	GTS ROOT CA Disclosure of Principles Statement
Document Version	9.0
Document Status	Approved
OID	1.3.6.1.4.1.50302.1.1.3.1.1.0
Issuance Date	July 4 <sup>th</sup> , 2023
Validity	July 4 <sup>th</sup> , 2024
Location	<a href="https://pki.globaltrustedsign.com/index.html">https://pki.globaltrustedsign.com/index.html</a>

**Note:** Regular updates to this document are conducted whenever justified.

**8. Contacts of the GTS ROOT Certification Authority**

Name	GTS Trust Group
Managers	Tolentino de Deus Faria Pereira José Luís de Sousa
Address	ACIN iCloud Solutions, Lda. Estrada Regional 104 N°42-A 9350-203 Ribeira Brava Madeira – Portugal
General e-mail	<a href="mailto:info@globaltrustedsign.com">info@globaltrustedsign.com</a>
Report e-mail	<a href="mailto:report@globaltrustedsign.com">report@globaltrustedsign.com</a>
Website	<a href="https://www.globaltrustedsign.com">https://www.globaltrustedsign.com</a>
Telephone	National: 707 451 451 <sup>1</sup> International: + 351 291 957 888 <sup>2</sup> (Portuguese - Option 1 / English - Option 2; GTS - Option 6) <sup>1</sup> Maximum amount to be paid per minute: 0.09€ (+VAT) for calls from fixed networks and 0.13€ (+VAT) for calls from mobile networks. <sup>2</sup> Cost of an international call to a fixed network, according to the current rate.

When any of the grounds for revocation set out in point 4.9.1. of the CP is identified, it should be communicated to the above-mentioned contacts

Certification suspension is not supported by the GTS ROOT CA.

## **9. Types of certificates, validation and use procedures**

### **9.1. Certificate Usage**

The certificates issued by the GTS ROOT CA trust hierarchy are used by different systems, applications, mechanisms and protocols, in order to guarantee the following security services:

- a) Confidentiality;
- b) Integrity;
- c) Authentication;
- d) Non-repudiation.

These services are obtained through the use of public key cryptography, through its use in the trust structure that the GTS ROOT CA provides. Thus, identification, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation services are obtained through the use of digital signatures. Confidentiality is guaranteed through the use of encryption algorithms when combined with key establishment and distribution mechanisms.

#### **9.1.1. Proper Certificate Uses**

Certificates issued by the GTS ROOT CA are regulated by this Principles Disclosure Statement and will be used in accordance with the function and purpose set forth in the Certification Practice Statement and the corresponding Certificate Policies, according to applicable law.

Relying Parties may verify the chain of trust of a certificate issued by the GTS ROOT CA, thus ensuring the authenticity and identity of the holder.

#### **9.1.2. Unauthorised Certificate Uses**

Certificates issued in the GTS ROOT CA trust hierarchy cannot be used for any function outside the scope of the uses described above, except when legally established in the applicable law.

The qualified trust services provided by the GTS ROOT CA are not authorized for use in high-risk activities or requiring a faultless activity, namely those related to the operation of hospitals, nuclear operations, air traffic control, rail traffic control, or any other activity where a failure could lead to death, personal injuries or serious damage to the environment.

### **9.2. Validation Procedures**

Qualified certificates issued by the GTS ROOT CA are trusted in the public context and comply with the following documents:

- GTS ROOT CA Certification Practices Statement:
  - Defines the practices followed by the GTS ROOT CA for certificate lifecycle management (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.50302.1.1.1.1.0)
- GTS ROOT CA Certificate Policy:
  - Defines the profile of Certificates of Certification Authorities (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.50302.1.1.2.1.1.0)

CRL can be accessed in <https://pki.globaltrustedsign.com/index.html>, assuring their availability 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, except in the event of a scheduled maintenance stop and properly communicated to the involved parties.

## **10. Limitation of trust in certificates**

### **10.1. Certificate Usage**

The use of the certificates issued to the holder must comply with the provisions of the respective certificate policies, available at <https://www.pki.globaltrustedsign.com/index.html>.

Certificates issued by the GTS ROOT CA are also used by the Relying Parties to verify the trust chain of a certificate issued by subordinated certifying authorities of the GTS ROOT CA trust hierarchy, as well as to ensure the authenticity and identity of the issuer of a digital signature generated by the private key corresponding to the public key contained in a certificate.

Certificates may be used in other contexts only to the scope permitted by applicable law.

Certificates issued by the GTS ROOT CA shall not be used for any function outside the scope of the uses described above.

Qualified trust services provided by the GTS ROOT CA are not intended to be used in high-risk activities or that require a faultless activity, such as:

- Operation of health facilities;
- Operation of nuclear facilities;
- Air traffic control;
- Rail traffic control;
- Or any other activity where a failure could lead to death, personal injuries or serious damage to the environment.

## 10.2. Audit Logs

Significant events that generate auditable records are considered to be the following:

- Security related events, including:
  - o Attempts to access (successful and unsuccessful) sensitive resources of GTS ROOT CA
  - o Operations carried out by members of the Working Groups
  - o Physical input/output security devices of several levels of safety.
- Requests for the issuance of certificates
- CRL updates;

Record entries include the following information:

- Event category;
- Date and Time of the event;
- Event description;
- Identity of the incident causative agent;
- Serial number of the event.

Audit records are kept available for at least 1 month after processing, and then archived in accordance with national law.

## 11. Holders Responsibilities

Certificate holders shall use their private key only for the purposes of which they are intended (as established in the *keyUsage* certificate field) and always for legal purposes.

The use of certificates is only allowed:

- o To whom is mentioned in the *Subject* field of the certificate and,
- o As long as the certificate remains valid (active state) and is not in the CRL of the GTS ROOT CA.

The certificate holder must request the revocation of a certain certificate, whenever there is knowledge or suspicion of the compromise of its private key, or any other act that recommends this action. The GTS ROOT CA stores all documentation used to verify the identity and authenticity of the entity requesting revocation.



A certificate may be revoked if any of the following conditions are met:

- Compromise or suspected compromise of the private key or the password to access the private key;
- Loss of the private key;
- Serious inaccuracies in the information provided;
- The compromise or suspected compromise of the GTS ROOT CA private key;
- Failure to comply with the responsibilities by the Certification Authority or the certificate holder;
- Whenever there are credible reasons to suggest that the certification services may have been compromised in such a way that questions the reliability of the certificates;
- By judicial or administrative resolution.

When using the certificate and its public key, the holder must ensure that the following conditions are met:

- Be aware of and understand the use and functionalities provided by public key cryptography;
- Be responsible for its correct use;
- Read and understand the terms and conditions described in the Certification Policies and Certification Practice Statements;
- Verify and validate the trust chains of the certificates;
- Verify the Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) with special attention to their extensions marked as critical and purpose of the certificate (*keyUsage*) in question;
- Trust the certificates, using them while they are valid.

## **12. Status Verification of Certificates issued by the GTS ROOT CA**

Other parties who rely on certificates issued by the GTS ROOT CA must:

- Use the CRL query mechanisms listed above, and check the status of the certificate at the time of its use. It is the user responsibility to verify it;
- Comply with the provisions specified in the Certificate Policies of the certificate in question (<https://www.pki.globaltrustedsign.com/index.html>);
- Use the certificate appropriately in accordance with the purposes of its issuance.

### **13. Limitations and Responsibilities**

The GTS ROOT CA:

- a) shall answer for damages and losses caused to any person in the exercise of its activity in accordance with Art. 26 of DL 62/2003.
- b) shall answer for losses caused to the holders or to third parties due to certificate status outdated information, following a revocation or suspension of a certificate once it is aware of it.
- c) shall take responsibility over the risks that individuals may suffer as a consequence of normal, or abnormal operation of its services.
- d) only shall answer for damages and losses caused by improper use of recognized certificates, when the limitations to the possible use is not stated in the certificates, in a way that is clearly acknowledged by third parties.
- e) shall not be responsible when the holder exceeds the limits set out in the certificate as to their possible uses, in accordance with the conditions established and communicated to the holder.
- f) shall not answer if the recipient of electronically signed documents does not check them and takes into account the restrictions on the certificate as to their possible uses.
- g) shall not assume any responsibility in case of loss or damage:
  - o Of services provided in case of war, natural disasters or any other act of force majeure;
  - o Caused by the use of certificates when they exceed the limits established in the Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement;
  - o Caused by improper or fraudulent use of the certificates or CRL issued by it.

### **14. Agreements, Certification Practices Statement and Certification Policies**

All applicable agreements, Certification Practice Statements, Certificate Policies and Privacy Policy are available at <https://www.pki.globaltrustedsign.com/index.html>.

### **15. Privacy Policy**

The GTS ROOT CA implements measures that guarantee the privacy of personal data, in accordance with the Portuguese legislation, ensuring that the information of the subject, requested for the

issuance of the respective qualified certificate, is not published and is processed in accordance with the Certificate Policies of the GTS ROOT CA.

## **16. Governing Law and Dispute Resolution**

Any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this document is governed by Portuguese law. In order to settle these disputes, the parties elect the Judicial District of Funchal as the dispute resolution forum, excluding any other.

## **17. Compensations**

The GTS ROOT CA will assume its responsibility with respect to possible damages, in accordance with the applicable legislation in force.

## **18. Legislation and Standards**

The GTS ROOT CA conducts its activity of issuing certificates according to the following rules/regulations:

- Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999, about an EU framework for electronic signatures;
- ETSI EN 319 401 – General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers, and the standards related to reliable services;
- Other national and European legislation related to the provision of qualified trust services.

## **19. Audits and Security Standards**

All interventions made to the GTS ROOT CA are validated by internal auditors. The GTS ROOT CA is audited by an independent auditor as required by the Supervisory Body. Its mission is to audit the infrastructure of the Certification Authority, regarding its technical and human resources, processes, policies and rules, having to submit an annual report to the Supervisory Body.

## **20. Acronyms**

<b>OSCP</b>	<i>Online Certificate Status Protocol</i>
<b>CRL</b>	Certificate Revocation List
<b>VPN</b>	<i>Virtual Private Network</i>

<b>CA</b>	Certification Authority
<b>DL</b>	Decree Law
<b>DCP</b>	Disclosure of Certification Principles
<b>EU</b>	European Union